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Introduction: The Balance between 
Human Rights and Security
Security is routinely invoked as a ground to justify 
“limits” on human rights (HR), and this is the case 
both in domestic human rights law (DHRL) and in 
international human rights law (IHRL).
The relationship between HR and security in a de-
mocracy has become particularly pressing recently 
in the United States and in Europe, especially post-
2001 with the rise of terrorism and the corresponding 
invocation of security by domestic authorities to jus-
tify measures affecting the rights of individuals in the 
context of the prevention or repression of terrorism. 
In the last fifteen years or so, cases have multiplied 
in practice giving rise to a detailed case-law1 and nu-
anced doctrinal analyses of what is usually described 
* This article is the written version of one of the two lectures I 
gave during the Fribourg-Hebrew University Joint Seminar in 
International Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem on 5th 
September, 2016, and it has largely kept its oral style. Many thanks to 
Matthieu Loup for his editorial assistance; to Yuval Shany, Aurélie 
Galetto, Tal Mimran and the twelve students from both universities 
for our lively discussions; and to the Jean and Bluette Nordmann 
Foundation for their generous financial support of the seminar.
1 See e.g. CJEU, European Commission and Others v. Yassin Abdullah 
Kadi, C-584/10 P, EU:C:2013:518 (Kadi II).
as the “balance” between HR and security2.
While the potential conflict between HR and security 
is one that can be encountered in any democracy, it 
is obviously more often in a context of armed con-
flict that their balancing becomes a common opera-
tion for lawyers. Once emergency and insecurity have 
become so ordinary as to constantly call for security-
based limits on HR, however, one may wonder about 
the applicability of the usual HR reasoning and tests 
used to justify such security-based limitations on HR. 
As a matter of fact, other regimes of international law, 
such as international humanitarian law (IHL) in par-
ticular, have been developed to address emergency 
and security threats in the context of armed conflicts. 
They have gradually given rise to adapted tests that do 
not consider insecurity as an exception to individual 
rights as it would be the case in peacetime, but as a 
routine concern. No wonder therefore that the rela-
tionship between IHL’s and IHRL’s respective treat-
ment of the relationship between individual rights 
and security is of primary concern to specialists when 
they discuss the relationship between those two con-
currently applicable regimes of international law.3
In this context, the Israeli practice of balancing HR 
and security stands out, both in its sheer volume and 
its degree of detail. This is due in large part to its rou-
tine application to the military occupation of the Oc-
cupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) by Israel ever 
since 1967, and the alleged constant state of emer-
gency that has ensued both for and within the (1948 
borders of the) State of Israel.
2 See J. Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’, 
(2003) 11:2 The Journal of Political Philosophy 191-210; J. Waldron, 
‘Security as a Basic Right (After 9/11)’, in C. R. Beitz / R. E. Goodin 
(eds), Global Basic Rights, Oxford: OUP 2009, 207-26; D. Cole / 
J. loBel, Less Safe, Less Free – Why America is Losing the War 
on Terror, New York / London: New Press 2007; D. Cole (ed.), 
Securing Liberty: Debating Issues of Terrorism and Democratic 
Values in the Post-9/11 United States, New York: International 
Debate Education Association 2011.
3 See Y. Shany, ‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Competing 
Legal Paradigms for Fighting Terror’, in O. Ben-naftali (ed.), 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights – Pas 
de Deux, Oxford: OUP 2011, 13-33; E. BenveniSti, The International 
Law of Occupation, 2nd edn, Oxford: OUP 2012, Introduction.
Besson
In this article, the author analyzes the issue of the 
balance between human rights and security. More 
precisely, she addresses three specific questions: 
Firstly, should human rights be “balanced” against 
security per se? Secondly, considering that human 
rights may be restricted on security grounds in 
certain circumstances, should the Israeli practice 
of balancing human rights and security be taken 
as an example? And thirdly, if one does so, should 
the Israeli practice also be followed by transposing 
this reasoning onto circumstances where the state 
of emergency has become ordinary? 
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More specifically, there are three kinds of situations 
which, at different times, or even at the same time 
and in a merged fashion, have led to the balancing 
between HR and security in Israel: (i) military secu-
rity in the context of occupation in the OPT; (ii) set-
tlers’ security in the context of occupation in the OPT; 
(iii) and civilian security in the context of terrorist at-
tacks on Israeli territory.4 Importantly, the majority 
view in Israel is that there should be no distinction 
between the HR and security balancing in time of 
war and military occupation and that same balanc-
ing in time of peace, and no discontinuity as a result 
between times of emergency and ordinary life.5 While 
some arguments for this position have been advanced 
(e.g. the extension of the scope of ordinary judicial 
review to cover activities related to the military oc-
cupation of the OPT and, accordingly, of HR protec-
tion in that context as well), there are important argu-
ments against that extension.6 One may mention, first 
of all, the fact that there have hardly been any cases in 
practice where the Israeli Supreme Court (Israeli SCt) 
has decided against the executive (and the military) in 
that context, hence actually playing a legitimizing and 
condoning role of violence across the board;7 second, 
the contamination of ordinary HR reasoning in IHRL 
through different restriction tests coming from IHL; 
and, finally, the threat to the purpose and integrity of 
IHL itself.
Nevertheless, and despite those controversies in the 
Israeli case-law and scholarship8, the Israeli practice is 
regularly invoked in current American and European 
debates as an example about how to balance HR with 
security concerns in the context of the application of 
4 See D. Kretzmer, The Occupation of Justice, Albany: State 
University of New York Press 2002, Ch. 7 and 8. 
5 See on the case-law of the Israeli SCt, Kretzmer (n 4); A. BaraK, The 
Judge in a Democracy, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2006, Ch. 7.
6 See Kretzmer (n 4), Ch. 7 and 8. 
7 See O. Ben-naftali, ‘PathoLAWgical Occupation: Normalizing 
the Exceptional Case of the Occupied Palestinian Territory and 
Other Legal Pathologies’, in O. Ben-naftali (ed.), International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law – Pas de 
Deux, Oxford: OUP 2011, 129-200.
8 See e.g. O. Ben-naftali / A. M. GroSS / K. miChaeli, ‘Illegal 
Occupation: Framing the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, (2005) 
23:3 Berkeley Journal of International Law 551-614; A. M. GroSS, 
‘Human Proportions: Are Human Rights the Emperor’s New 
Clothes of the International Law of Occupation?’, (2007) 18:1 
European Journal of International Law 1-35; Ben-naftali (n 7); A. 
M. GroSS, The Writing on the Wall – Rethinking the International 
Law of Occupation, Cambridge: CUP 2017.
IHRL in a democracy.9 True, the sheer quantity of that 
balancing practice by Israeli authorities, but also the 
detail of the conceptualization it has given rise to, both 
in judicial reasoning and academic analysis,10 provide 
a ready explanation for its relevance abroad where the 
problem is more recent.11 Still, it is important to pause 
to reflect about the justification of balancing HR with 
security before endorsing it too quickly, both in future 
Israeli cases and in other contexts and especially the 
American and European ones. 
Three questions arise in this respect. (i) Should we ac-
tually “balance” HR against security per se and, if so, 
how should we do that? This is a legal-philosophical 
question pertaining to the moral justifications of HR 
restrictions and the kinds of restrictions one should 
deem justified. (ii) Provided security may amount 
to a ground to restrict HR in certain circumstances, 
should we take the Israeli practice of balancing HR 
and security as an example in this respect? This is a 
legal-doctrinal question pertaining to the interna-
tional legal validity, in both IHRL and IHL, of the 
reasoning of the Israeli SCt pertaining to the balance 
between HR and security. (iii) Provided we do, should 
we also follow the Israeli example in transposing what 
should amount to exceptional reasoning in situations 
of armed conflict onto circumstances where emer-
gency has become ordinary as it is the case of the 
long-term occupation of Palestine by Israel? This is 
a legal-structural question pertaining to the transpo-
sition of a form of reasoning adapted to emergency 
situations such as armed conflicts, mostly stemming 
from IHL, to ordinary circumstances of life in a de-
mocracy where terrorist attacks occur that lie at the 
core of IHRL, and hence to the content of so-called 
international occupation law (IOL).
Critical reflection, and caution about balancing HR 
with security does not only matter for the legitimacy 
of future HR reasoning in Europe, and in particular 
for the securing of justice in democracies facing ter-
rorism, but also for future HR protection in the OPT 
9 See e.g. A. BaraK, ‘Human Rights in Times of Terror – A Judicial Point 
of View’, Opening of the Judicial Year Seminar, European Court of 
Human Rights, Strasbourg, 29th January, 2016, http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/Speech_20160129_Barak_JY_ENG.pdf; J. limBaCh, ‘Human 
Rights in Times of Terror. Is Collective Security the Enemy of Individual 
Freedom?’, (2009) 1:1 Goettingen Journal of International Law 17-27. 
10 See BaraK (n 5), Ch. 16 and 7. 
11 Other explanations may include the tight relationship between German 
and Israeli constitutional traditions (e.g. on notions such as “democratic 
self-defence” or “militant democracy”), especially among the older 
generation of Israeli judges. See also Kretzmer (n 4), 15.
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and, by extension, in Israel itself. It has long become 
clear indeed that Israeli democracy has paid a heavy 
toll for the banalization or, worse, normalization of 
HR violations and injustices occurring in the OPT.12 
The quasi-automatic way in which HR are balanced 
against security is arguably a central part of that pro-
blem. Drawing from the Israeli experience with HR 
balancing with security and transplanting it elsewhere 
should clearly be resisted therefore.
The structure of the argument defended in this arti-
cle is three-pronged. We first need to clarify what is 
meant by “human rights” and “security” (I.) and how 
the restrictions of HR work in general (II.), before ad-
dressing the security-based restrictions to HR more 
specifically and how some form of balancing may be 
justified among them, both in general and in the con-
text of the Israeli occupation of Palestine (III.).
I. Basic Notions
Among the basic notions required for a discussion of 
the potential balancing between HR and security, it 
is important to clarify at the outset what is meant by 
“human rights” (A.) and by “security” (B.).
A. Human Rights
The HR, and the duties they give rise to, applicable to 
HR violations committed by Israel in the OPT stem 
from DHRL, IHL and IHRL. 
DHRL binds Israel in the shape of that State’s own ca-
talogue of basic rights arising under the Israeli Basic 
Law and their respective interpretations by the Israeli 
Supreme Court. It also includes the DHRL that was 
applicable in Palestine before the occupation, provi-
ded there was any under British Mandate or Jordani-
an law, and that binds Israel as an Occupying Power.13
IHL also protects some of the individual rights of the 
occupied population.14 To that extent, those IHL indi-
vidual rights duties also bind Israel towards the Pales-
tinian population qua Occupying Power under IOL. 
Last but not least, IHRL binds Israel as a State, and 
12 See Kretzmer (n 4), Conclusion; D. Shulman, ‘Israel’s Irrational 
Rationality’, New York Review of Books, 22nd June, 2017, http://www.
nybooks.com/articles/2017/06/22/israels-irrational-rationality. 
13 Art. 43 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, annexed to the Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land (1907; Hague Regulations), and its 
reference to the “laws in force in the country”.
14 E.g. Geneva Convention (IV) on Civilians (1949; Geneva Convention 
[IV]); Hague Regulations.
stems from the most important IHRL treaties ratified 
by Israel15, but also from customary IHRL16. It also 
binds Israel as an Occupying Power to the extent that 
the IHRL that was applicable in Palestine before occu-
pation, provided there was any under British Mandate 
or Jordanian law, is to be respected as well.17 One may 
also mention, to the same effect, the IHRL principle 
under which the IHRL applicable to a population fol-
lows that population in all circumstances, and even in 
case of occupation.18 
Importantly, IHL and IHRL may overlap to the extent 
that the scope of IHRL is materially and territorially 
such that it also applies to armed conflicts, including 
occupation,19 and applies outside of the State’s official 
territorial boundaries, provided its authorities exer-
cize personal or territorial jurisdiction (or effective 
control) outside of its territory20.
This last point is particularly sensitive with respect to 
the individual HR that are also protected under IHL. 
Indeed, the individual rights protected under IHL/
IOL are not protected in the same way as in IHRL. 
In particular, first of all, they only pertain to the HR 
of the occupied population, and not of the popula-
tion of the Occupying Power. Second, they are sub-
mitted to a (military) necessity test that differs from 
the proportionality test used in IHRL. And, finally, 
the compe ting security concern that may apply to set 
limits upon them are strictly military and do not ex-
tend to the security concern of the civilian popula-
tion of the Occupying Power, whether in the occupied 
territories or on its official territory.21 To that extent, 
the relationship between IHL and IHRL matters when 
both regimes apply concurrently to a given individual 
15 E.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966; 
ICCPR); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966; ICESCR); Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984; 
CAT); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (1965; CRC).
16 See ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 
2004, p. 136, par. 157.
17 See Art. 43 Hague Regulations.
18 See HRC, General Comment 20, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 
I), p. 200.
19 See ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226; ICJ, The Wall (n 16); ICJ, Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005, p. 168. 
20 See ICJ, The Wall (n 16).
21 See GroSS, ‘Human Proportions’ (n 8), 25-6; Ben-naftali (n 7), 
177-8.
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right’s violation,22 since their joint application may af-
fect the content and restriction of that right in those 
cases.23
B. Security
Security is a vague and polysemic concept. Although 
it is used broadly, especially with respect to ways of 
protecting it and to the consequences of not doing so, 
it is almost never defined.
From a philosophical perspective, security refers to a 
collective good (and, potentially, an individual/col-
lective interest in that good), i.e. the absence (and not 
only the “freedom from”) of risk/threat of violation of 
another good (individual or collective), i.e. usually life 
or (physical or material) integrity.
Depending on its subjects, there are many types of 
security:24 (i) personal security, i.e. the individual se-
curity of people; (ii) public/collective/“homeland”25 
security, i.e. the collective security of a whole popu-
lation; (iii) national security, i.e. the security of the 
State or its government (e.g. its sovereignty, integrity, 
or capacity to function); (iv) international security 
(pertaining either to the State’s external or to the in-
ternational community’s security as a whole). Those 
different types of security may pull into different di-
rections and do not necessarily overlap with one an-
other. For instance, public or homeland security is 
not necessari ly aggregative of personal security, and 
national security may be at risk without public inse-
curity.
Security needs to be distinguished from safety, which 
refers to the absence of threat to life/physical inte grity 
of an individual. Safety differs from security to the ex-
tent that it is only individual and physical as opposed 
to individual and/or collective and material and/or 
physical for security. Security also needs to be distin-
guished from violence: not all security threats are vio-
lent, but violence is the main case of insecurity. 
In terms of its relationship to HR, security may itself 
be considered a HR to the extent that there may be 
an individual interest in the collective good of (pub-
lic or homeland) security protected as HR. Some au-
thors, like Henry Shue, actually consider the HR to 
security as a “basic” right, i.e. a HR whose protection 
22 See ICJ, The Wall (n 16), par. 136.
23 See Kretzmer (n 4), Ch. 7. 
24 See Waldron, ‘Security as a Basic Right’ (n 2), 210-5.
25 See on this post-9/11 notion, Waldron, ‘Security as a Basic Right’ 
(n 2), 212.
is indispensable to the effective protection of other 
HR.26 When security is considered a HR, the conflicts 
between HR and security become conflicts of rights, 
and, as we will see, the justifications of the mutual re-
strictions those rights set on one another are different 
from those that arise from the relationship between 
HR and the collective good of security.
In legal terms, security is just as vague a concept. One 
should distinguish between the different types of se-
curity protected under domestic and international 
law, on the one hand, and the normative forms they 
take depending on whether they are protected as HR 
or as collective goods, on the other. 
In domestic law, security is referred to as a legal con-
cept both under domestic security legislation and un-
der DHRL. In the latter case, security is invoked both 
as a HR and as a collective good justifying restrictions 
to HR. In the case of security norms applicable to the 
OPT, one should also mention the questionable valid-
ity under IOL of the reference by Israeli authorities 
to pre-IHRL British Mandate and Jordanian drastic 
legislation pertaining to security detention.27
In international law, security arises as a legal concept 
in the United Nations Charter (UNC) and its so-called 
“collective security system” (both as a collective good 
[public, national and/or international security] and as 
a HR [personal security])28; under international de-
velopment law (as a collective good [human security, 
i.e. some collective form of personal security]); under 
IHL/IOL (as a collective good [military security])29; 
and under IHRL (as a collective good [public or na-
tional security] restricting HR and as a HR itself [per-
sonal security or safety])30.
The terminology varies a lot between domestic and 
international law and the respective regimes within 
them.31 The case-law remains largely silent about how 
to interpret those different types of security, however. 
26 See H. Shue, Basic Rights – Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, 2nd edn, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996, 20 ff. 
For a discussion, see L. lazaruS, ‘The Right to Security’, and V. 
tadroS, ‘Rights and Security’, in R. Cruft / m. liao / S. m. renzo 
(eds), The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, Oxford: 
OUP 2015, 423-41 and 442-58.
27 See Kretzmer (n 4), 121-4. See also BenveniSti (n 3), Ch. 8.
28 E.g. Art. 1, 33, 39 and 42 UNC.
29 E.g. Art. 5, 27 par. 4, 49, 53, 78 Geneva Convention IV; Art. 52 
Hague Regulations.
30 E.g. Art. 5 European Convention on Human Rights (1950; ECHR); 
Art. 9 ICCPR.
31 See e.g. the reference to “public safety and public life”, in Art. 43 
Hague Regulations.
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It usually conflates personal, public and national se-
curity, and sometimes even assimilates security and 
safety or security and public order. Moreover, States 
are usually granted a broad margin of appreciation 
in this respect. Accordingly, those different types of 
security protected under domestic and international 
law, and within each of them and their respective re-
gimes, may conflict with one another or some of them 
may be subsumed under stronger or weaker ones de-
pending on the needs of the authorities invoking se-
curity to limit HR. 
This is particularly problematic in the OPT due to the 
joint application of IHL and IHRL by Israeli authori-
ties when identifying a threat to security and the con-
flation between IHL’s “military and security needs” 
with the security needs of the State of Israel and its 
citizens, both in the OPT and in Israel, and not only of 
the military, including interest in land and economic 
interests.32
II. Restrictions of Human Rights in 
General
HR are only rarely absolute, and their restrictions are 
a central part of HR reasoning in practice. After ex-
plaining why HR restrictions are justifiable in the first 
place (A.), this section distinguishes between different 
grounds for the justification of HR restrictions (B.).
A. Justifying Human Rights Restrictions
HR practice shows that, in some cases, HR have to be 
restricted to further other moral or social interests or 
the HR of others with which they conflict. Thus, free 
movement may sometimes have to be restricted in the 
interest of security. When such restrictions are justi-
fied, the right is not deemed as violated.
At the same time, however, we like to think that 
free speech, like other HR, is not reducible to other 
moral interests such as security and cannot simply 
be weighed and balanced against those interests like 
any other interest.33 That resistance to balancing HR 
grows even stronger when it is meant to take place 
against other HR, as in balancing the right to free 
movement against the right to security. This puzzling 
32 See Israeli SCt, 15 March 1979, Ayub et al. v. Minister of Defence et 
al., H.C. 606/78 (the Beth El case). See Kretzmer (n 4), 116-8.
33 See R. noziCK, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford: Harper Collins 
1974, 28 ff. on human rights as “side-constraints”; R. dWorKin, 
Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth 1994, 190 ff. on 
human rights as “trumps”.
position is difficult to define with precision, but it 
clearly holds a middle ground between the two posi-
tions that long prevailed over how to resolve conflicts 
between moral rights, on the one hand, and between 
moral rights and other moral considerations, on the 
other: in short, Kantian absolutism, and the derived 
prioritization of HR, on the one hand, and utilitarian 
relativism, and the corresponding weighing and bal-
ancing of HR, on the other.
The puzzle that faces HR theorists is reconciling the 
specific stringency of HR for them to be able to pro-
tect individuals as ends in themselves with the real-
ity of their conflict with other moral considerations, 
including other HR, and the need to settle such con-
flicts. It reflects the sheer theoretical difficulty of con-
ceptualizing moral trade-offs that are not quantitative 
and do not actually imply “weighing and balancing” 
HR. This theoretical puzzle is well reflected in James 
Griffin’s contention that “human rights are resistant 
to trade-offs, but not completely so”.34 Solving the 
puzzle requires, as I have argued elsewhere,35 finding 
a way between stating the radical incommensurabil-
ity of HR (literally, their inability to be compared and 
ranked to one another) and resorting to pragmatic 
solutions to settle their conflicts, on the one hand, 
and emphasizing their commensurability and apply-
ing quantitative weighing and balancing to reconcile 
them in case of conflict, on the other.
Interestingly, this theoretical ambivalence is echoed in 
the HR practice, and in particular in IHRL.36 Restric-
tions to HR are usually hard to justify legally. More-
over, even though trade-offs are common in practice, 
HR reasoning is also structured so as to exclude them 
in some cases. As a result, an important part of the 
practice endorses a form of HR balancing,37 while 
other parts reveal attempts to “restrict restrictions” 
of HR (from the German Schrankenschranken) and 
even to organize hierarchies between HR with certain 
rights being deemed as absolute (so-called “absolute 
rights”)38 or with absolute thresholds of protection 
being established within the content of certain HR 
(so-called “core duties” or “inner core” – from the 
34 J. Griffin, On Human Rights, Oxford: OUP 2008, 76.
35 See S. BeSSon, ‘Human Rights in Relation’, in S. Smet / E. BremS 
(eds), When Human Rights Clash at the European Court of Human 
Rights – Conflict or Harmony?, Oxford: OUP 2017, 23-37.
36 See E. BremS (ed.), Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights, 
Antwerp: Intersentia 2008.
37 E.g. Art. 8 to 11 par. 2 ECHR.
38 E.g. Art. 3 ECHR.
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German Kerngehalt). 
As I have argued elsewhere, there is actually a third and 
principled way between quantitative weighing and ba-
lancing, on the one hand, and categorical prioritizing, 
on the other.39 Following Jeremy Waldron, one may 
refer to it as “qualitative balancing”.40 Qualitative ba-
lancing aims at the conciliation of the reasons under-
pinning the conflicting HR duties in case of conflict. 
It may therefore be described as “balancing” by lack of 
a better term for the comparison and mutual restric-
tion of reasons, on the one hand, and as “qualitative” 
to distinguish it from quantitative balancing, on the 
other. One should indeed consider that HR duties do 
not have “weight” strictly speaking, but “stringency”. 
Qualitative balancing, so defined, is justified and 
o perates by reference to the relational and egalitarian 
nature of HR.41 It differs from the other two alterna-
tive methods to resolve conflicts of rights mentioned 
before. It is clearly distinct, first of all, from the iden-
tification of formal and abstract hierarchies of rights. 
Such hierarchies do not correspond to the egalitarian 
dimension of HR: all HR and right-holders are equal. 
Nor do they fit the duty to reconcile reasons as far 
as possible rather than abide by one only. HR duties 
should therefore be balanced in case of conflict and 
cannot merely be ranked. This does not mean, how-
ever, that we should resort to a quantitative balanc-
ing of rights, and this is my second distinction. The 
consequentialist and even utilitarian take on HR and 
their relations implied by quantitative balancing does 
not correspond to their egalitarian dimension either. 
So how does qualitative balancing work? It is equa-
lity that provides the internal ground common to all 
HR on the basis of which they can relate qualitatively 
to one another and on the basis of which they may 
be compared and mutually restricted in the balan-
cing exercize. This implies resorting to the socio-
comparative and hence collective dimension of all 
HR as equal rights qua internal basis of comparison 
and restriction between them. Importantly, the egali-
tarian dimension of HR dispenses from identifying a 
meta-value or principle external to the rights them-
39 See BeSSon (n 35). 
40 J. Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991, Cambridge: 
CUP 1993.
41 See S. BeSSon, ‘La structure et la nature de droits de l’homme’, in M. 
hottelier / M. hertiG (eds), Introduction aux droits de l’homme, 
Brussels: Bruylant 2014, 19-38, 19; S. BeSSon, ‘Justifications of 
Human Rights’, in D. moeCKli / S. Shah / S. SivaKumaran (eds), 
International Human Rights Law, 2nd edn, Oxford: OUP 2013, 
34-52.
selves as a basis for the comparison and restriction. 
It avoids thereby undermining the specificity of HR, 
and especially their incommensurability and special 
stringency.42
Of course, the role of equality in qualitative balancing 
also implies the existence of inherent egalitarian limi-
tations on the justifiable restrictions to every human 
right: the ultimate egalitarian limit to restriction is the 
erosion of the right itself, as this would threaten the 
basic moral equality of its right-holder. This is how 
one could interpret the role played by the so-called 
“inner core” of every HR among the limitations to 
justifiable restrictions to that right in the reasoning 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Last but not least, the egalitarian dimension of HR 
and their relations has institutional implications for 
the procedure through which their mutual restric-
tions are justified in case of conflict. These procedures 
should be democratic.43 This is confirmed by the ref-
erence to the test of “democratic necessity” in the 
restriction test under the paragraphs 2 of Art. 8-11 
ECHR and to its requirement of a (democratic) legal 
basis for any restriction. 
B. Grounds for Human Rights 
Restrictions
If certain HR restrictions are justifiable in general and 
provided HR duties may be balanced qualitatively 
either when they conflict with other moral consider-
ations (i) or among themselves (ii), more needs to be 
said about those two grounds for the restriction of HR 
and the exact conditions for those respective justifica-
tions.
Of course, both grounds are not always easy to keep 
apart, especially as some may argue that certain (not 
all) public interests are aggregative and may consist 
in the sum of other fundamental individual interests 
and the corresponding HR, as a result. This may be 
the case of certain types of public or national security 
in particular. The distinction between HR and other 
moral considerations matters in practice, however. 
Moreover, it also matters for reasons that have to do 
with the moral non-consequentialist specificities of 
HR by comparison to other moral considerations, as 
42 See Waldron (n 40); Waldron, ‘The Image of Balance’ (n 2).
43 See O. de SChutter / F. tulKenS, ‘Rights in Conflict: The European 
Court of Human Rights as a Pragmatic Institution’, in E. BremS 
(ed.), Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights, Antwerp: Intersentia 
2008, 169-216.
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explained before. Individual rights amount to more 
normatively than the individual interests they protect 
and, even if some collective interests are aggregative, 
they cannot aggregate individual rights equally to 
other individual interests.44 
First of all, HR restrictions based on other moral con-
siderations. Those may include, depending on the HR 
and the IHRL regime at stake, in particular the public 
order, morals, public health or security.45 
Depending on the IHRL regime, and the respective 
general or HR-specific restriction clause therein, 
there are usually three other conditions for the justi-
fication of HR restrictions grounded in those moral 
considerations. First, the justification of a HR restric-
tion mostly requires a democratic procedure to estab-
lish the democratic necessity of the restriction. This 
is what one may refer to as the “necessity in a demo-
cratic society” test. Moreover, the restriction usually 
needs to rely on a legislative and hence public basis. 
Finally, it should not infringe absolute rights or core 
duties corresponding to the HR “inner core”. 
All three conditions fit the egalitarian and, by ex-
tension, democratic justification for the qualitative 
balancing of HR against other moral considerations 
proposed in the previous section, as opposed to either 
quantitative “weighing and balancing” or qualitative 
prioritizing of HR over other moral considerations. 
Importantly for our purpose, the democratic neces-
sity test is not explicitly referred to as a “proportional-
ity test” in IHRL.46 As I have argued elsewhere, this 
may actually be used in order to interpret that test 
differently in IHRL from the mainstream three-prong 
proportionality test used in many domestic traditions 
of public law, such as the German and Israeli ones in 
particular.47 The latter proportionality test amounts 
either to an instrumental rationality test or to a cost-
benefit test (and especially its “suitability” and “neces-
sity” prongs). Accordingly, it brings with it a quan-
titative and consequentialist flavour criticized in the 
previous section and tends to assume the commensu-
rability of HR and duties. So-doing, it risks watering 
down the equality of HR, therefore. There is, however, 
an alternative way to understanding “proportional-
44 See R. dWorKin, ‘Principle, policy, procedure’, in A Matter of 
Principle, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1985, 
72-103.
45 E.g. Art. 10 par. 2 ECHR; Art. 12 par. 3 ICCPR.
46 See ECtHR, Chassagnou and Others v. France, app. no 25088/94, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:1999:0429JUD002508894, par. 113.
47 See BeSSon (n 35). 
ity”’ and that is as a co-relation between equal human 
right-holders or between them and duty-bearers. 
Second, HR restrictions based on other HR when HR 
are in conflict with one another. The common view, 
and one that can be read in the ECtHR’s judgments, 
is that HR conflicts are conflicts between the interests 
these rights protect.48 As a result, the resolution of HR 
conflicts is often approached as the resolution of con-
flicts between interests. 
As I have argued elsewhere, rather than consider con-
flicts of HR as pertaining to rights stricto sensu, we 
should understand them as conflicts between one or 
many of the specific duties corresponding to those 
rights in a given context.49 This qualification was first 
made by Jeremy Waldron.50 Once conflicts of HR are 
approached as conflicts of HR duties, it is easy to see 
that they are best understood as conflicts of reasons, 
and not (only) as conflicts of interests. This confirms, 
as I argued in the previous section, the inadequacy 
of the consequentialist and quantitative approach to 
their “weighing and balancing”. 
True, HR protect individual objective interests that 
are sufficiently and equally important to give rise to 
duties: they work as intermediaries, in other words, 
between these interests and the duties. However, the 
content of HR, i.e. their corresponding duties to re-
spect, protect, and aid, should not be equated nor-
matively with those interests they protect as an object 
and should not be reduced to them. There is much 
more to the duties than the interests they are protect-
ing against a specific threat in specific circumstances 
and this added normative content may enter into 
conflict too. Accordingly, some conflicts of rights may 
be traced back to conflicts of interests, of course, but 
they need not. Nor, and this is a second distinction,51 
should the content of HR, i.e. their duties, be conflat-
ed with what makes them of value, i.e. their justifi-
cations. This is particularly important for it prevents 
conflating the stringency of their duties with that of 
their value(s) (e.g. dignity or equality). The resolution 
of conflicts of rights should not therefore necessarily 
be guided by the value(s) related to the HR. 
Reducing HR conflicts to conflicts of either interests 
or values would approach the content of HR not only 
48 See ECtHR, Odièvre v. France, app. no 42326/98, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2003:0213JUD004232698, par. 41-9.
49 See BeSSon (n 35).
50 Waldron (n 40).
51 See BeSSon, ‘Justifications’ (n 41).
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erroneously as unique and stable over time (all the 
duties corresponding to a HR would have the same 
stringency), but also as completely unrelated to other 
HR and their corresponding duties (all the duties cor-
responding to a HR would always conflict with all the 
duties corresponding to another HR merely because 
they conflict with them in one case), thereby cutting 
HR duties off from their relational and egalitarian 
dimension to others. Considering conflicts of rights 
from their duty-side is actually the only way to ex-
plain some of the variations in the occurrence, on the 
one hand, and in the scope of those conflicts, on the 
other, even when they are pertaining to the same HR. 
It accounts for how conflicts between the same HR 
may give rise to different moral issues in each case 
and in turn to different resolutions. Protecting the 
egalitarian and relational dimension of HR when they 
conflict is precisely what the qualitative balancing of 
HR proposed in the previous section aims to achieve.
III. Security-Based Limits of Human 
Rights
There are four main constellations in HR reasoning 
where security may be invoked to “limit” HR lato sen-
su: security-based reservations (A.), exceptions (B.), 
derogations (C.) and restrictions (D.) to HR. 
The main and most common kind of limits are se-
curity-based HR restrictions. It is also the one where 
the so-called “balancing” between HR and security 
should allegedly take place. Before focusing on the 
latter, and explaining why it is wrong to endorse the 
“weighing and balancing” approach in that context 
as well, it is important to briefly introduce the other 
three constellations of security-based HR limitations 
in this section.
Of course, there are, at least, three other contexts in 
HR reasoning where security may be invoked. First 
of all, security may be mentioned as a ground for the 
limitation of domestic judicial jurisdiction over the 
executive or the military’s security policy, and hence 
of domestic judicial review (e.g. on grounds of the 
“political question” or the “act of State” doctrines). 
Second, security may be invoked as a ground for the 
forfeiture of one’s individual rights due to anti-secu-
rity activity. This is a radical consequence that only 
applies in IHL,52 however, and not in IHRL, except 
maybe in the guise of the prohibition of the abuse of 
52 See e.g. Art. 5 Geneva Convention IV.
rights under Art. 17 ECHR. Third, security may be 
mentioned, in the context of “self-defence”53 or “state 
of necessity”54, as circumstances precluding wrong-
fulness and hence State responsibility.
A. Security-Based Reservations to Human 
Rights
Reservations to HR enable States to limit abstractly, 
and ex ante, the applicability of certain HR to given 
contexts, and hence to restrict their material scope. 
They may do so with a view to security considerations 
(e.g. scope exclusions at times of war).
The validity of such reservations is limited, however, 
both under general international treaty law and IHRL. 
The general limits to their content are to be found un-
der Art. 19-20 VCLT (compatibility with the “object 
and purpose of the treaty” and the absence of other 
States parties’ objections) and Art. 53 VCLT (respect 
of jus cogens). Additional specific conditions arise un-
der IHRL. They include, under most IHRL regimes, 
the requirement of an explicit statement addressed 
to the other State parties or the international body or 
court to be sent before ratification and with a suffi-
ciently specific content, the necessity of approval by 
that international treaty body or a court, followed by a 
requirement of regular updates, often combined with 
regular pressure on the part of the international treaty 
body or court to withdraw the reservations. 
The consequences of a valid security-based reserva-
tion are a State-relative and HR-specific abstract re-
striction of the material scope of a HR in order to 
avoid its application to concrete cases that would im-
ply a conflict with personal/public/national security. 
In such cases, no HR duties arise and there is no need 
therefore to justify a security-based restriction to that 
HR. To date, Israel has filed no such security-based 
reservations pertaining to its IHRL duties.55
B. Security-Based Exceptions to Human 
Rights
Exceptions to HR amount to a delineation of the ma-
terial scope of HR, so as to exclude certain areas or 
conducts. When they are security-based, they draw 
53 E.g. Art. 51 UNC; Art. 21 Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (UN Doc. A/RES/56/83, 12th 
December, 2001; ARSIWA). See ICJ, The Wall (n 16).
54 Art. 25 ARSIWA. See ICJ, The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 7; ICJ, The 
Wall (n 16).
55 See ICJ, The Wall (n 16).
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the boundaries of HR in such a way as not to give rise 
to tensions with security concerns or alleviate secu-
rity risks. 
Importantly, exceptions are easier for some HR than 
for others depending on how open-ended their con-
tent is and whether it is a matter of degree or not.56 
Such exceptions may result from the HR provision it-
self in IHRL treaties.57 Most of the time, however, they 
emanate from its interpretation by the competent in-
ternational body or court.58 Unlike reservations and 
derogations, therefore, exceptions are general and not 
State-relative, and apply to all States parties to a given 
IHRL regime. 
In case of a valid security-based exception, a given 
HR will not give rise to duties outside its security-
sensitive scope. As a result, potential conflicts are cir-
cumvented through a narrow definition of the HR’s 
material scope and this dispenses of the need to ba-
lance that HR and security outside of that scope. The 
consequences of a valid security-based exception are 
a general and HR-specific abstract restriction of the 
material scope of a HR in order to avoid its applica-
tion to concrete cases that would imply a conflict with 
personal/public/national security. Israel has invoked 
and benefited from such security-based exceptions to 
its IHRL duties.59
C. Security-Based Derogations to Human 
Rights
Derogations to HR amount to their suspensions. The 
suspension of a specific HR prevents its application 
for a certain period of time, and, as a result, no rights 
and duties arise from that HR in concrete cases even 
if those cases actually fall within the HR’s scope of ap-
plication. It is justified by the exceptional inability of 
State to protect HR due to a situation of emergency. 
Such emergency-based suspensions actually aim at 
enabling the State to set the emergency aside and to 
get back to full HR protection. 
Of course, there are conditions to fulfil before sus-
pending a given HR. The conditions for a HR dero-
gation vary among IHRL regimes, but they usually 
include an explicit notification to the international 
56 See Waldron, ‘The Image of Balance’ (n 2), 198.
57 E.g. Art. 2 par. 2 ECHR.
58 E.g. Art. 5 par. 1 ECHR. See ECtHR, Hassan v. the United Kingdom, 
app. no 29750/09, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2014:0916JUD002975009, 
par. 104.
59 See ICJ, The Wall (n 16).
body or court, the existence of security concerns – 
and those include both national security (State) and 
public/collective security (people) –,60 a time-limit 
based on strict conditions of necessity, the exclusion 
of its application to non-derogable rights (such as, in 
particular, the prohibition of torture, discrimination, 
slavery or murder), and regular updates to the inter-
national body or court. 
Provided it is valid, a security-based HR derogation 
is both State-relative and HR-specific. It differs from 
a security-based HR reservation to the extent that it 
arises only in a case of emergency and not abstractly 
in all cases, and it differs from a security-based HR 
exception to the extent that it is State-relative and not 
general. 
Importantly, security-based derogations are also al-
lowed in circumstances of extraterritorial application 
of IHRL,61 and in the context of both an international 
armed conflict (IAC) and a non-international armed 
conflict (NIAC), thereby leading to the concurrent 
application with IHL.62 To that extent, they may ap-
ply to a context of military occupation, as it has been 
argued by Israel with respect to Art. 9 ICCPR.63 How-
ever, as explained before, a HR derogation can only 
last as long as it is necessary and cannot be perma-
nent. Moreover, it is only justified to the extent that 
the return to normalcy is possible and that it enables 
such a development. Derogations are not meant to 
back a long-term status of emergency and therefore 
should not be allowed to cover long-term occupation, 
especially when that occupation is intentional (“self-
imposed risk” or “emergency”). 
D. Security-Based Restrictions to Human 
Rights
Restrictions to HR are the most common kind of lim-
its to HR, and this is also true of security-based limits 
to HR that usually take the shape of security-based 
restrictions. In such cases, a specific HR violation falls 
within the scope of application of that right in the ab-
60 See e.g. Art. 4 ICCPR; Art. 15 ECHR.
61 See ECtHR, Hassan (n 58). In that decision, however, the ECtHR 
interprets Art. 5 ECHR so as to expand the latter’s list of scope-
exclusions and hence to make the concurrent application of IHL 
compatible with it without resorting to derogations under Art. 15 
ECHR. For a critique, see M. milanoviC, ‘A Few Thoughts on 
Hassan v. United Kingdom’, EJIL: Talk!, 22nd October, 2014, http://
www.ejiltalk.org/a-few-thoughts-on-hassan-v-united-kingdom.
62 See UK House of Lords, R. (on the application of Al-Jedda) (FC) v. 
Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58.
63 See ICJ, The Wall (n 16).
Quid? 1/2016Besson Quid? Special Edition 2017: The Law in These Parts
15
sence of reservations or exceptions, and there are no 
derogations affecting its applicability, but restricting 
the HR may still be justified under certain conditions 
or grounds. The consequence of a justified HR re-
striction is a State-relative and HR-specific concrete 
restriction to specific HR duties. 
The justifications of security-based HR restrictions 
vary, as I explained before, depending on whether se-
curity is considered as a “public interest” conflicting 
with HR (1.) or as another conflicting HR (2.). 
1. As a Public Interest Restriction to Human 
Rights
Security-related public interests, including “national 
security”, “public security” or “public safety”, are men-
tioned as grounds for HR restrictions in IHRL. This 
is the case in general restriction clauses,64 but also in 
particular restriction clauses specific to a given HR65. 
The types of “security” at stake in those restriction 
clauses remain indeterminate, however, and need to 
be further elaborated through interpretation in each 
case. Depending on its subjects, the kind of security 
envisaged is in principle the State’s (national security), 
but can also amount in some cases to personal or pub-
lic security, or even to personal or public safety. Most 
of the time, those different types of security are actu-
ally straddled in practice. 
Another difficulty encountered in practice is the re-
course to “weighing and balancing” between those 
types of security and individual HR as if justifying a 
HR restriction was a matter of quantitative balance 
between an individual’s interest (i.e. her HR) and the 
collectivity’s or majority of individuals’ interest (e.g. 
their security). In the same vein, proportionality is 
usually the test resorted to in this balancing exercize 
between HR and security.
Following Jeremy Waldron, there are four critiques 
one may make to the “weighing and balancing” of HR 
and security.66 
First of all, weighing and balancing HR and security 
has consequentialist and even utilitarian implications. 
This is problematic because, as I explained before, HR 
duties qua moral reasons should not be “weighed” and 
then added/deducted like interests in a quasi-algebra-
64 E.g. Art. 4 ICESCR.
65 E.g. Art. 8-10 par. 2 ECHR; Art. 12 par. 3 ICCPR.
66 See Waldron, ‘The Image of Balance’ (n 2), 195 ff.
ic fashion. Nor should the proportionality test used 
in this balancing exercize be equated either with a 
means/end rational assessment or with a cost/benefit 
economic calculus. It is better approached, as I argued 
before, as a test of the equal relation between human 
right-holders. Second, balancing HR and security 
may give rise to an unequal and hence unjust distri-
bution of the burden of security. There is a substantial 
risk indeed that the same people (and hence a minor-
ity) will be those bearing the burden of the security of 
a majority, whereas we should all bear it equally (or, 
at least, take turns). This is contrary to the equality 
of HR and their right-holders. Third, balancing HR 
and security may have unintended consequences. It 
may enhance the States’ security powers and general-
ize HR restrictions and even State-originating secu-
rity threats, including for the majority whose security 
was allegedly at stake in the first place. To quote Da-
vid Cole, people may end up being “less safe and less 
free” as a result of the balancing of HR and security.67 
Finally, balancing HR and security may lead to an un-
fair assessment of risks. Security is difficult to assess 
objectively. As a result, it is difficult to avoid political 
and strategic considerations from being merged into 
security concerns. This is problematic because HR re-
strictions should not be driven merely by the subjec-
tive perception of risk, but by an assessment of wheth-
er the restriction taken in the name of security could 
actually have the desired consequences.
Interestingly, those critiques of the indeterminacy of 
the notion of “security” and of the moral downsides 
of the “weighing and balancing” of HR and security, 
but also of the rational instrumentality-approach to 
proportionality,68 apply particularly well to what is 
practised by the Israeli SCt in relationship to security-
based restrictions of the HR of the Palestinian popu-
lation in the OPT. 
First of all, with respect to the type of “security” con-
sidered by the Israeli SCt, one observes the straddling 
between IHRL and IHL notions of HR and security. 
To start with, the Court considers not only the indi-
vidual rights of the occupied population, as it should 
under IHL, but the HR of everyone, including of Is-
raelis in Israel and of settlers in the OPT, as one would 
under IHRL. The security considered by the Court, 
67 Cole / loBel (n 2).
68 Compare e.g. BaraK’s rationalized notion of proportionality (BaraK 
[n 5], Ch. 7), with Waldron’s critique of proportionality-algebra 
(Waldron, ‘The Image of Balance’ [n 2], 192-4).
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moreover, is not only military security, as should be 
the case under IHL, but the personal and public se-
curity of all Israelis in Israel and in the OPT, i.e. set-
tlers, as it may under IHRL. To do so, the Court relies 
in particular on an extensive interpretation of “public 
safety and public life” in Art. 43 Hague Regulations.69 
Second, with respect to “proportionality”, the Court 
does not endorse the strict military necessity test of 
IHL, but the three-prong proportionality test used in 
public law and by extension, some argue wrongly, in 
IHRL (i.e. suitability, necessity and proportionality 
stricto sensu).70 This has led to the increase of military 
commanders’ discretion, and actually to condoning 
it.71 Worse, applying that instrumental rationality test 
of proportionality to military occupation rationalizes 
it and makes it a “zone of reasonableness”, to quote 
Martti Koskenniemi.72 
In short, what characterizes the Israeli SCt’s reason-
ing in this respect is the straddling of IHRL and IHL 
depending on what gives the Occupying Power most 
leeway in the name of security at the expense of the 
HR of the occupied population, and eventually of 
their equality as human right-holders under IHRL. 
This has been criticized, therefore, as a perversion of 
the equality of HR and hence of IHRL itself by apply-
ing that law to the circumstances of long-term mili-
tary occupation.73 
With its utilitarian flavour, first of all, the reasoning of 
the Israeli SCt imposes the unequal burden of security 
onto the Palestinians and makes them a permanent 
minority under IHRL.74 It also expands, secondly, the 
Israeli State’s powers. This has become clear within Is-
raeli territorial jurisdiction as well, and not just in the 
OPT. It suffices, for instance, to observe the extension 
of national security powers of the State inside Israel 
in response to protection again security threats posed 
by Palestinians, the extension of the practice of admi-
nistrative detention without trial, or that of the use of 
69 See Israeli SCt, Beth El case (n 32). See Kretzmer (n 4), 119.
70 See Israeli SCt, 30 June 2004, Beit Sourik Village Council v. The 
Government of Israel and the Commander of the IDF Forces in the 
West Bank, HCJ 2056/04.
71 See GroSS, ‘Human Proportions’ (n 8), 9, 29; Kretzmer (n 4), 
118-20.
72 M. KoSKenniemi, ‘Occupied Zones – “A Zone of Reasonableness?”’, 
(2008) 41:1-2 Israel Law Review 13-40.
73 See GroSS, ‘Human Proportions’ (n 8), 28 ff.; Ben-naftali (n 7), 
198 ff.
74 See GroSS, ‘Human Proportions’ (n 8), 8, 18, 31, 35. 
torture beyond ticking-bomb cases.75 All this, in turn, 
necessarily has an impact on the civil liberties of Is-
raelis themselves. Finally, the Israeli SCt’s reasoning 
also leads to an unfair assessment of risks. The (sub-
jective) assessment of insecurity is informed by po-
litical and strategical concerns (pertaining e.g. to the 
settlements, the so-called “separation barrier”, natural 
resources and esp. water, etc.), and not only focused 
on military concerns.76 
2. As Human Rights-based Restriction to 
Human Rights
Security may also be approached as a HR in itself,77 
and its potential conflict with other HR as a HR con-
flict, thereby leading to justified HR-based restrictions 
of HR in IHRL. This is the case in general restriction 
clauses,78 but also in particular restriction clauses spe-
cific to given HR79. 
Following Henry Shue, the HR to security may actu-
ally be considered a basic right, because it is indis-
pensable to the realization of other HR.80 The conse-
quence would seem to be that it can only be limited 
by another basic right in case of conflict, and this may 
imply the priority of the basic HR to security over 
non-basic HR. 
According to Jeremy Waldron, there are three spe-
cific critiques one may oppose to the alleged priority 
of the HR to security in case of HR conflict.81 
First, the circularity threat. If restricting a HR is nec-
essary to protect a basic right whose protection is nec-
essary to other HR, the result may be to lose what we 
were aiming to protect in the first place. Worse, such a 
conflict may quickly become a conflict between basic 
rights to security and the resolution of such conflicts 
in favour of one of those basic rights may violate the 
equality of HR. So, the only way to save the argument 
from circularity would be to give up on HR equality. 
However, this would undermine the justification of 
HR altogether and especially that of basic HR, there-
by setting the basic rights of others, including to se-
75 See also GroSS, ‘Human Proportions’ (n 8), 28. On the “metastatic 
tendency of torture”, H. Shue, ‘Torture’, (1978) 7:2 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 124-43, 142-3.
76 See Kretzmer (n 4), 195-6.
77 E.g. Art. 5 ECHR; Art. 9 ICCPR.
78 E.g. Art. 4 ICESCR.
79 E.g. Art. 8-10 par. 2 ECHR; Art. 12 par. 3 ICCPR.
80 See Shue (n 26), 20 ff.
81 See Waldron, ‘Security as a Basic Right’ (n 2), 221 ff.
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curity, as a core limit to the priority of the basic right 
to security of some. Second, the absence of clear-cut 
answers. Security is a matter of degree and not “an all 
or nothing” matter. It is not clear therefore when the 
indispensability of the HR to security really comes in 
as a criterion for the justification of a HR restriction. 
Finally, necessary conditions for the indispensability 
of the HR to security to the realization of other HR 
cannot replace sufficient ones. Evidence that the pro-
tection of security is even sufficient to their realiza-
tion should be provided for the indispensability of the 
HR restriction to be established, and that is not easy 
to provide.
In the OPT, those critiques of HR restrictions 
grounded in the priority of HR to security over other 
HR should be of special concern. Indeed, the HR to 
security usually considered in the balancing exercize 
is only that of Israelis (whether settlers or mainland 
residents), thereby treating both groups of right-hold-
ers unequally or, worse, by artificially masquerading 
their inequality into a facade of equality and turning 
IHRL into an instrument of oppression.82 Treating 
both groups of human right-holders of the equal basic 
HR to security, i.e. Palestinians and Israelis, as proper 
equals would be the ultimate challenge for the Israeli 
SCt. 
Conclusions: Beware of Ordinary 
Emergencies and their Banalization
To conclude, let us go back to the three questions 
raised in the introduction: first, about the justification 
of the balancing of HR and security per se; second, 
about that balancing in the Israeli SCt’s reasoning 
with IHRL and IHL; and finally, and more generally, 
about its application to long-term occupation and its 
respective international law regime in IOL.
First of all, the balancing of HR and security, as it is 
generally practised, is not an easy feature of IHRL 
reasoning. It is actually one we should be particu-
larly weary of in America and Europe in the current 
anti-terrorism context. In short, it needs to be ap-
proached with care so as not to threaten HR reason-
ing with a fatal form of utilitarianism; generate an 
unjust distribution of the burden of security; give rise 
to unintended consequences including an increase in 
security-oriented State powers; and lead to unfair as-
sessments of risk. To address those shortcomings, this 
82 See GroSS, ‘Human Proportions’ (n 8), 28 ff.
article has proposed to replace quantitative weighing 
and balancing of HR and security, and the related 
understanding of the proportionality test, by a more 
qualitative and egalitarian form of balancing, and the 
corresponding relational comparison and restriction 
test. It has also developed a taxonomy of the types 
of security at stake in HR reasoning depending on 
their subjects, thereby hopefully encouraging more 
fine-tuned assessments of their identification and re-
lations in the future. It has also mapped the different 
constellations in which those different kinds of secu-
rity concerns may be invoked to limit HR either as 
security-based reservations, exceptions, derogations 
or restrictions stricto sensu.
Secondly, the Israeli practice of balancing HR and 
security, and its recourse to proportionality may not 
only be criticized on those general grounds, but also 
on their own. The practice of the Israeli SCt is charac-
terized indeed by the straddling of IHL rules and prin-
ciples with HR-restrictions reasoning under IHRL. 
Over time, this has affected, within the balancing exer-
cize: the scope of human right-holders, that has been 
extended by the Israeli SCt from Palestinian residents 
under IHL to Israeli residents and nationals (both on 
the mainland and in the OPT); the subjects of security, 
that has been extended by the Court to cover not only 
military security under IHL, but also the personal 
and public security of all Israelis as would be the case 
under IHRL; and the use of a three-prong public law 
proportionality test by the Court, instead of the mili-
tary necessity test that should apply under IHL. While 
the concurrent application of IHL and IHRL is not in 
question, the application of IHRL presumes peace and 
ordinary circumstances of equality between human 
right-holders. Drawing on IHRL in spite of the lack 
thereof has proven problematic both for the protection 
of the HR of the occupied population as it is formally 
put on a par with Israelis whereas they are clearly not 
equal in practice, thereby begging the very question of 
the protection of their HR and making their situation 
worse under IHRL, on the one hand, and for the pro-
tection of military security concerns of the Occupying 
Power under IHL, on the other.
Finally, when applied to a long-term military occupa-
tion context such as the Israeli occupation of Palestine, 
security-based HR balancing under IHRL, including 
in its revisited qualitative and egalitarian form, may 
actually be counterproductive both for IHRL and 
IHL. The resort to security-based HR restrictions 
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(that are meant to be exceptional under IHRL) in 
order to cover military emergency situations in the 
OPT (that are common under IHL) has contributed 
to banalizing the emergencies related to occupation 
and has turned the exception into the norm. There 
are ways of protecting HR in the context of long-term 
occupation while taking into account security con-
cerns, without, however, incurring the consequences 
identified in this article. This requires, however, going 
back to the drawing board of IOL and devising a set of 
international rules and principles that do not pretend 
to apply IHRL as if the basic conditions of equality 
in a democracy were respected in order to justify the 
recourse to exceptional “democratic self-defence”, on 
the one hand, and do not merely revert to IHL as if 
the military emergency in the OPT was new and all 
that was needed to fix the ills of occupation was the 
use of force, on the other.
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